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COMMENT
SEARCHING THE PARAMETERS OF THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT WARRANT
REQUIREMENT-REASONABLENESS
GONE OVERBOARD: UNITED STATES V.
VILLAMONTE-MARQUEZ
The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures.1 A search or seizure
The fourth amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to
be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.

In the early cases involving the fourth amendment, the Supreme Court applied a literal
interpretation to the prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures, defining the
interest protected in terms of property law concepts. 1 W. RiNGEL, SEARcHEs & SEizUREs,
ARRESTS AND CONFESSIONS § 1.2, at 1-3 (2d ed. 1983); see, e.g., Hester v. United States, 265

U.S. 57, 59 (1924) (fourth amendment protection does not extend to open fields); Gouled v.
United States, 255 U.S. 298, 305-06 (1921) (seizure of private papers unreasonable even
without showing of force or coercion). This literal interpretation manifested itself in the
doctrine of "protected zones," which approximated the borders of a person's property,
within which the fourth amendment could be violated only if the intrusion were made by a
government official. 1 W. RINGEL, supra, § 1.2, at 1-3. This concept led to such distinctions
as that between curtilage, which was protected under the fourth amendment, and open
fields, which were not protected. Id.; see Hester, 265 U.S. at 59. It was not until Justice
Brandeis' dissent in Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 471 (1928), overruled, Katz v.
United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352-53 (1967), that fourth amendment protection was defined
in terms of a privacy, rather than a property, interest. 277 U.S. at 478 (Brandeis, J., dissenting); 1 W. RINGEL, supra, § 1.2, at 1-5. In Olmstead, the majority held that a person's telegraph or telephone messages did not come within the purview of the fourth amendment. 277
U.S. at 465. Dissenting, Justice Brandeis argued that "every unjustifiable intrusion by the
Government upon the privacy of the individual, whatever the means employed, must be
deemed a violation of the Fourth Amendment." Id. at 478 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). The Court eventually adopted Justice Brandeis' analysis. See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio,
392 U.S. 1, 16 (1968) (fourth amendment applies to "stop and frisk" procedures on the
street); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967) (fourth amendment protection extends to people rather than places).
Prior to the 1960's, the fourth amendment was, with rare exceptions, applied only to
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made without a warrant is considered unreasonable unless it falls
within certain limited exceptions.2 Section 1581(a) of Title 19 of
the United States Code authorizes customs officers to stop and
board any vessel at any time and place in the United States or
within customs waters without a warrant for the purpose of examining the vessel's documentation and conducting a search.3 In upcriminal investigations. 1 W. RINGEL, supra, § 1.3, at 1-7. The Court has since applied the
fourth amendment to many types of government activity. See, e.g., Camara v. Municipal
Court, 387 U.S. 523, 534-35 (1967) (housing inspections). In addition, the fourth amendment
has been held applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment. Mapp v. Ohio,
367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961).
2 Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528-29 (1967); Stoner v. California, 376 U.S.
483, 486 (1964); United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 51 (1951). Some of the exceptions to
the warrant requirement are searches and seizures incident to lawful custodial arrests, e.g.,
United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973), searches and seizures based on probable cause where exigent circumstances exist, e.g., Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 51
(1970), searches and seizures by consent, e.g., Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219
(1973), administrative inspections, e.g., Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 598 (1981), emergency situations, e.g., Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 509 (1978), welfare visits, e.g., Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 318 (1971), inventory searches of impounded vehicles, e.g.,
South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 372-73 (1976), "stop and frisk" procedures, e.g.,
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 26-27 (1968), seizures of objects in "plain view," e.g., Harris v.
United States, 390 U.S. 234, 236 (1968), and border searches, e.g., United States v. Ramsey,
431 U.S. 606, 621 (1977). For a discussion of the various exceptions to the warrant requirement, see 1 W. RINGEL, supra note 1, chs. 9-17.
At common law, evidence obtained through an illegal search or seizure was admissible. 1
J. VARON, SEARCHES, SEIZURES AND IMMuNrrms 39 (1961); 8 J. WIGMORE, WIGMORE ON EWDENCE § 2183, at 5 (3d ed. 1940). The fourth amendment, while preserving "the right of the
people to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures," does not expressly "provide any
remedy for the violation of this right." 1 W. RiNGEL, supra note 1, § 1.5, at 1-16. In order to
fill this void, the Supreme Court adopted the exclusionary rule, which provides for the suppression of evidence obtained from an unreasonable search or seizure. Weeks v. United
States, 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914). The Weeks Court explained: "the duty of giving [the fourth
amendment] force and effect is obligatory upon all entrusted under our Federal system with
the enforcement of the laws." Id. at 392. The Supreme Court also has made the rule applicable to state prosecutions under the fourteenth amendment. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643,
655 (1961). The exclusionary rule applies to all evidence directly obtained in an illegal
search or seizure and to any derivative evidence obtained from information revealed by the
"unreasonable" search or seizure. 1 W. RINGEL, supra note 1, § 3.2, at 3-3; see, e.g., Wong
Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484 (1963); Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States,
251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920).
8 19 U.S.C. § 1581(a) (1982). Section 1581(a) provides:
Any officer of the customs may at any time go on board of any vessel or vehicle at any place in the United States or within the customs waters or, as he may
be authorized, within a customs-enforcement area established under the Anti-.
Smuggling Act, or at any other authorized place, without as well as within his
district, and examine the manifest and other documents and papers and examine,
inspect, and search the vessel or vehicle and every part thereof and any person,
trunk, package, or cargo on board, and to this end may hail and stop such vessel
or vehicle, and use all necessary force to compel compliance.
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holding boardings made pursuant to section 1581(a), federal courts
have relied on recognized exceptions to the warrant rule rather
than on the apparently unqualified authority granted by the statute.' Recently, however, in United States v. Villamonte-Marquez,5
Id. (citation omitted). Since Coast Guard officers are considered customs officers, see §
1401(i), they possess the same authority under section 1581(a), in addition to their independent statutory authority to board vessels, 14 U.S.C. § 89(a) (1982). Section 89(a) of title 14
provides that the Coast Guard may:
go on board of any vessel subject to the jurisdiction, or to the operation of any
law, of the United States, address inquiries to those on board, examine the ship's
documents and papers, and examine, inspect, and search the vessel and use all
necessary force to compel compliance.
Id.
The stopping and boarding of a vessel by law enforcement authorities constitutes a
"seizure" within the meaning of the fourth amendment. See United States v. Whitmore,
536 F. Supp. 1284, 1291 (D. Me. 1982), aff'd sub nom. United States v. Dillon, 701 F.2d 6
(1st Cir. 1983); cf. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653 (1979) (stop of vehicle considered a
seizure within meaning of the fourth amendment); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16 (1968)
(police officer stopping and detaining an individual constitutes a seizure). The boarding can
also constitute a search. See 1 W. RINGEL, supra note 1, § 2.2, at 2-4 (Supreme Court has
broadly defined "search" to include any intrusion of an area in which there is a reasonable
expectation of privacy).
4 Carmichael, At Sea with the Fourth Amendment, 32 U. MIAu L. REv. 51, 93 (1977).
Most courts that have upheld the constitutionality of a boarding pursuant to section 1581(a)
have inferred a statutory requirement that customs officers have a reasonable suspicion of
criminal activity aboard the vessel. See Blair v. United States, 665 F.2d 500, 505 (4th Cir.
1981); United States v. Streifel, 665 F.2d 414,422 (2d Cir. 1981). Thus, where a combination
of circumstances has given customs officers "reasonable and articulable grounds" for suspecting a smuggling operation, courts have sustained the search and seizure of the vessel.
See, e.g., United States v. Green, 671 F.2d 46, 53-54 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1135
(1982); Blair,665 F.2d at 505; Streifel, 665 F.2d at 423; accord United States v. Glen-Archila, 677 F.2d 809, 813 (11th Cir. 1982) (sustaining constitutionality of a boarding pursuant to
14 U.S.C. § 89(a)), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 165 (1983). Grounds that have been deemed
adequate for the stopping and boarding of boats by customs officials include a low-floating
boat previously listed as a suspected smuggling vessel, Green, 671 F.2d at 53-54, and use of
a shrimping vessel out of season, United States v. D'Antignac, 628 F.2d 428, 434 (5th Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 967 (1981). Courts have equated boardings pursuant to section
1581(a) with brief investigatory stops on land that can be made only when law enforcement
officers reasonably believe that criminal activity may be present. See Streifel, 665 F.2d at
423.
The Ninth Circuit has upheld boardings pursuant to section 1581(a) based on the border search exception to the warrant requirement. See, e.g., United States v. Stanley, 545
F.2d 661, 667 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 917 (1978); United States v. Tilton, 534
F.2d 1363, 1366 (9th Cir. 1976); United States v. Solmes, 527 F.2d 1370, 1372 (9th Cir.
1975); see also Comment, The FourthAmendment Afloat: Customs Searches, Drug Smuggling and the Balancing Test in the Fifth Circuit, 68 GEo. L.J. 1035, 1042-43 (1980). Border
searches without cause are considered reasonable in recognition of the important interest
the sovereign has in policing its boundaries. United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 616-19
(1977); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 154 (1925). To fall within this exception, the
search may occur at the border itself or at its "functional equivalents." Almeida-Sanchez v.
United States, 413 U.S. 266, 272-73 (1973). The Ninth Circuit has held that boardings that
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the Supreme Court, in the absence of alternative grounds and relying solely on the blanket authority delegated to customs officers by
the statute, held that a boarding made without a warrant pursuant
to section 1581(a) did not violate the fourth amendment.'
In Villamonte-Marquez, customs officers were patrolling the
Calcasieu River Ship Channel when they observed the Henry Morgan II, the defendants' 40-foot sailboat, which was anchored approximately 18 miles inland from the Gulf of Mexico.7 When one
of the defendants merely shrugged his shoulders in response to a
question from a customs officer, the officer and a state policeman
went aboard the vessel to investigate its documentation." While on
board, the customs officer noticed the smell of marijuana and observed burlap-wrapped bales of the drug through an open hatch.9
The defendants immediately were arrested.' 0
At trial, the defendants' motion to suppress evidence obtained
by the search was denied," and they were found guilty of violating
federal drug laws."2 The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that the officers' initial boarding of the boat was
unreasonable under the fourth amendment. 13 The Supreme Court
occur in waterways near the border qualify as searches at functional equivalents of the border. E.g., Tilton, 534 F.2d at 1366.
5 103 S. Ct. 2573 (1983).
6 Id. at 2582.
7 Id. at 2576-77. The Calcasieu River Ship Channel connects Lake Charles, Louisiana, a
designated Customs Point of Entry, with the Gulf of Mexico. Id. at 2576. All vessels traveling between Lake Charles and the Gulf of Mexico must use this channel. Id.
8 Id. at 2576-77. The customs officers had noticed a large freighter which created a
heavy wake as it passed the Henry Morgan II, and caused the sailboat to be tossed from
side to side. Id. at 2576. The officers then inquired into the welfare of the crew of the sailboat. Id. at 2576-77. Ostensibly, because one of the respondents merely shrugged his shoulders in response, the officers boarded the vessel. Id. at 2577.
Once on board the vessel, a customs officer discovered that the home port designation
of "Basilea" displayed on the stern was Latin for Basel, Switzerland. Id. Upon examination,
it was discovered that the vessel was of French registry. Id.
9 Id. at 2577.
10 Id.
1 See United States v. Viamonte-Marquez, 652 F.2d 481, 484 (5th Cir. 1981), reu'd,
103 S. Ct. 2573 (1983). The search of the Henry Morgan II revealed approximately 5,800
pounds of marijuana. 103 S. Ct. at 2577.
12 103 S. Ct. at 2577. The respondents were found guilty of possession of a controlled
substance with intent to distribute, see 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (1982), conspiracy to possess a
controlled substance with intent to distribute, see id. § 846, importation of a controlled
substance, see id. § 952(a), and conspiracy to import a controlled substance, see id. § 963.
103 S.Ct. at 2577.
18 Villamonte-Marquez, 652 F.2d at 488. The Fifth Circuit declined to uphold the
boarding as a valid border search because the officers, at the time of the boarding, had no
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granted certiorari,14 and reversed the Fifth Circuit decision, holding that the boarding pursuant to section 1581(a) was reasonable
within the meaning of the fourth amendment. 15
Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority,16 noted that in

1790 the First Congress enacted a comprehensive statute17 to pro-

vide for the collection of duties on imported goods.18 Section 31 of
this statute appeared to be the original version of section 1581(a). 19
Since the Congress that enacted section 31 had proposed the Bill
of Rights, the majority reasoned that the members of that Congress must have endorsed searches and seizures authorized by the
original statute as reasonable within the meaning of the fourth
amendment. 20 The Court thus concluded that section 1581(a) had
an "impressive historical pedigree.""1
After reviewing the Court's recent decisions concerning automobile stops, Justice Rehnquist acknowledged that random automobile stops without suspicion on public highways violate the
fourth amendment.22 The majority, however, asserted that similar
reason to believe that the Henry Morgan II had crossed the border. Id. at 486. The court
also found that a "reasonable suspicion of a law violation" could not have been inferred
from the surrounding circumstances. Id. at 487-88.
14 457 U.S. 1104 (1982).
15 103 S. Ct. at 2582.
16 Chief Justice Burger and Justices White, Powell, Blackmun, and O'Connor joined in
the majority opinion.
17 Act of Aug. 4, 1790, ch. 35, 1 Stat. 145 (current version at 19 U.S.C. §§ 1202-1677(g)
(1982)).
11 103 S. Ct. at 2577. The purpose of the statute was "to provide more effectually for
the collection of the duties imposed by law on goods, wares and merchandise imported into
the United States, and on the tonnage of ships or vessels." Act of Aug. 4, 1790, ch. 35, 1
Stat. 145, 145 (emphasis omitted).
19 103 S. Ct. at 2577. Section 31 of the original Act provided, in part:
That it shall be lawful for all collectors, naval officers, surveyors, inspectors,
and the officers of the revenue cutters herein after [sic] mentioned, to go on board
of ships or vessels in any part of the United States, or within four leagues of the
coast thereof, if bound to the United States, whether in or out of their respective
districts, for the purposes of demanding the manifests aforesaid, and of examining
and searching the said ships or vessels. ...
Act of Aug. 4, 1790, ch. 35, § 31, 1 Stat. 145, 164 (current version at 19 U.S.C. § 1581(a)
(1982)).
20 103 S. Ct. at 2578-79 (citing Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 623 (1886)).
21 103 S. Ct. at 2578.
22Id. at 2579. Justice Rehnquist's discussion included an analysis of three Supreme
Court cases: Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979), in which random spot checks of
automobiles were held unreasonable in the absence of an articulable and reasonable suspicion of unlawful conduct, id. at 663; United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976),
in which stops of automobiles in the absence of any suspicion of wrongdoing were held permissible only at reasonably located fixed checkpoints, id. at 562; and United States v.
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random investigations of vessels are consistent with the fourth
amendment because of the factual distinctions between a vessel in
a waterway with access to the sea and an automobile on a public
highway near the border.2 3 Finally, the Court argued that the pervasiveness and complexity of documentation requirements for vessels indicate that the interest of the Government in assuring compliance with these requirements outweighs the intrusion on fourth
amendment rights involved in boardings pursuant to section
1581(a).24 Thus, Justice Rehnquist concluded that the stopping
and boarding of the Henry Morgan II did not violate the fourth
amendment.25
In a vehement dissent, 26 Justice Brennan contended that the
case was moot because the indictment against the respondents had
been dismissed before the petition for certiorari was filed. 27 AdBrignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975), in which it was decided that officers may not make
random stops of automobiles near the border unless they reasonably believe that the vehicles contain illegal aliens, id. at 883.
23 103 S. Ct. at 2579-80. The majority asserted that fixed checkpoint stops of vessels are
not practical because vessels, unlike automobiles, need not follow established thoroughfares.
Id. at 2580. The Court observed that while fixed checkpoints may prove feasible for commerce on inland waters that must eventually funnel into relatively narrow straits or canals,
such procedures are less feasible with waterways providing ready access to the open sea. Id.
Justice Rehnquist also rejected the respondents' contention that fixed checkpoints could be
established at various ports, reasoning that vessels on or near the open sea could conduct
their operations without ever coming into harbor. Id.
24 Id. at 2580-82. The Court noted that the statutes and regulations governing the documentation of vessels were more complex than state provisions for motor vehicle registration, id. at 2580, and held that in contrast to the strong government interest in assuring
compliance with documentation requirements, the corresponding intrusion on fourth
amendment rights was limited, id. at 2581-82.
25 Id. at 2582. The officers' conduct once aboard the sailboat was not at issue. Id. at
2577 n.3. If the initial boarding without suspicion was valid, the officers could seize any
evidence in "plain view" without a warrant, and this evidence could not be suppressed. See
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 465 (1971); Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234,
236 (1968) (per curiam). Thus, the sole issue presented was the constitutionality of the initial boarding to conduct the document check pursuant to section 1581(a). 103 S.Ct. at 2577
n.3.
26 Justice Marshall joined in Justice Brennan's dissent. Justice Stevens joined in Part I
of the dissent regarding the issue of mootness.
27 103 S. Ct. at 2582-84 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The mandate of the court of appeals
was issued on October 29, 1981. Id. at 2583 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The Fifth Circuit
granted the Government's motion to recall the mandate and stay its reissuance until December 7. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting). When the stay expired, the mandate was reissued on
December 8. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting). The Government moved for dismissal of the indictment and this motion was granted on December 21. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting). On
January 18, 1982, the Government's petition for certiorari was filed. Id. (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
The majority dismissed the respondents' contention that the case was moot, finding

1984]

FOURTH AMENDMENT

dressing the merits of the case, the dissent attacked as without
precedent the majority's grant of unlimited discretion to customs
officers.28 Justice Brennan contended that the standards established by the Court's "vehicle-stop" cases require that any stop or
search be supported by some objective limitation on the discretion
of the law enforcement authorities. 9 Moreover, the dissent continued, the intrusion in Villamonte-Marquez was more severe than
those commonly associated with vehicle stops.30 Disputing the majority's contention that the maritime setting posed special
problems that made fixed checkpoints impractical, Justice Brennan contended that the nature of the waterway in the instant case
was conducive to the effective employment of such measures.3 1 Regardless of the feasibility of maintaining fixed checkpoints, the dissent concluded, a requirement of reasonable suspicion for stops
would allow 32the Government sufficient leeway for effective law
enforcement.

In Villamonte-Marquez, the Supreme Court has permitted
customs officers virtually unlimited discretion to board vessels pursuant to section 1581(a). By rejecting any objective limitation on
the officers' discretion to initiate a boarding, the Court has nethat the Court's reversal of the Fifth Circuit's decision normally would reinstate the conviction and the sentence entered by the district court. Id. at 2575-76 n.2; see United States v.
Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 352-53 (1975). The Court held that the issuance of the mandate was
irrelevant to the issue of mootness. 103 S. Ct. at 2576 n.2; see Carr v. Zaja, 283 U.S. 52, 53
(1931). Since the preliminary steps in a criminal proceeding are merged into the sentence,
the majority concluded that a separate reinstatement of the original indictment was unnecessary. 103 S. Ct. at 2576 n.2.
25 103 S. Ct. at 2585 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The dissent noted that only the border
search exception has approximated the broad grant of discretion approved by the Court. Id.
at 2585 n.6 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see supra note 4.
29 103 S. Ct. at 2588 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see infra note 56 and accompanying text.
30 103 S. Ct. at 2588 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan noted that the intrusion
in the instant case involved the actual boarding of a private vessel, rather than a mere
stopping and questioning of the occupants as in the "vehicle-stop" cases. Id. (Brennan, J.,
dissenting). The dissent reasoned that since a boat often serves as a residence, its owners
and occupants reasonably could have a greater expectation of privacy than the driver and
passengers of an automobile. Id. at 2588-89 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
31Id. at 2589 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The dissent observed that the ship channel was
similar to the type of limited-access highways where fixed checkpoints have been set up by
the Border Patrol. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan implied that it would not
be difficult to establish a fixed checkpoint on the channel. See id. at 2589 & n.10 (Brennan,
J., dissenting).
2 Id. at 2590 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The dissent contended that "'the nature of
illegal alien traffic and the characteristics of smuggling operations tend to generate articulable grounds for identifying violators."' Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting United States
v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 883 (1975)).
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glected the traditional scrutiny given to alleged intrusions on
fourth amendment rights. This Comment will examine the Supreme Court's rationale for upholding the constitutionality of the
boarding of the Henry Morgan II, identify the weaknesses in the
Court's reasoning, and consider some of the unforeseen practical
implications of the Court's holding.
HistoricalPedigree
The Court's "historical pedigree" argument supported a broad
interpretation of section 1581(a) by reference to the statute's ancestor, section 31 of the Revenue Service Cutter Act (section 31).11
The original section 31, however, authorized a boarding to examine
the manifests of a vessel, 4 whereas section 1581(a) authorizes a
boarding to inspect the manifest and other documents.s5 At the
time of the original statute's enactment, a manifest only was required for vessels carrying merchandise from foreign countries into
the United States. 6 The purpose of the manifest was to facilitate
the collection of duties by customs officers and to enable the Government to receive an account of the ship's cargo without a
search.3 7 During this period, the overwhelming majority of nonmilitary ships were merchant vessels which transported goods.38
" See Act of Aug. 4, 1790, ch. 35, § 31, 1 Stat. 145, 164 (current version at 19 U.S.C. §
1581(a) (1982)).
See id.
" See 19 U.S.C. § 1581(a) (1982). The original version of the statute, section 31 of the
Revenue Service Cutter Act, Act of Aug. 4, 1790, ch. 35, § 31, 1 Stat. 145, 164, was reenacted
several times with no significant changes. See Tariff Act of 1930, ch. 497, § 581, 46 Stat. 590,
747; Tariff Act of 1922, ch. 356, § 581, 42 Stat. 858, 979; Act of March 2, 1799, ch. 22, § 54, 1
Stat. 627, 668. Section 581 of the Tariff Act was amended in 1935 to include the current
language that authorizes customs officers to "examine the manifest and other documents
and papers" of the vessel. Act of Aug. 5, 1935, ch. 438, § 203, 49 Stat. 517, 521-22 (1935)
(codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1581(a) (1982)) (emphasis added).
3" See Act of Aug. 4, 1790, ch. 35, § 9, 1 Stat. 145, 155. Section 9 provided that[N]o goods, wares or merchandise shall be brought into the United States from
any foreign port or place, in any ship or vessel belonging in the whole or in part to
a citizen or citizens, inhabitant or inhabitants of the United States, unless the
master or person having the charge or command of such ship or vessel shall have
on board a manifest or manifests in writing ....
Id.
", A manifest is a written document summarizing all the bills of lading on the ship.
Carmichael, supra note 4, at 54 n.9. The master of a vessel arriving from a foreign port
must deliver a copy of the manifest to the designated employee of the Department of the
Treasury. See 19 U.S.C. § 1439 (1982).
1 Recent Case, The Fourth Amendment Adrift: Search and Seizure on the High Seas,
26 Loy. L. REv. 1017, 1026 (1980).
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Today, recreational vessels are the predominant type of boat on
the water.3 9 When the Legislature enacted section 31, it could not
have envisioned the nature and extent of recreational boating as it
is engaged in today; nor would the random search of pleasure
crafts have been consistent with the commercial orientation of the
statute. Therefore, the historical pedigree of section 1581(a) should
extend, at most, only to commercial vessels. °
Balancing of Interests
After establishing that the delegation of power under section
1581(a) was constitutionally acceptable, the Court turned to the
reasonableness of the boarding of the HenryMorganII.L1 In determining whether a particular search or seizure is reasonable within
the meaning of the fourth amendment, courts traditionally have
balanced the government interest furthered by the search or
seizure against the degree of intrusion upon the constitutionally
protected rights of the individual. 2 In balancing these interests,
19 In 1981, there were 12.5 million recreational boats in the United States. UNrED
STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF ThE
UNITED STATES 235 (1982).
40 See Fish v. Brophy, 52 F.2d 198, 201 (S.D.N.Y. 1931). Fish involved the boarding of
the plaintiff's pleasure boat in New York Bay, and a subsequent warrantless search of the
vessel. Id. at 198. The court held that section 581 of the Tariff Act of 1922, ch. 356, § 581, 42
Stat. 979 (current version at 19 U.S.C. § 1581(a) (1982)), did not apply to pleasure boats. 52
F.2d at 201. The district court reasoned that manifests were required only in the case of
vessels carrying cargo from foreign ports. Id. at 200. In addition, the court believed that the
Legislature could not have intended to place pleasure boats in the same category as commercial vessels. Id. at 201. Two years later, in Olsen v. United States, 68 F.2d 8 (2d Cir.
1933), the Second Circuit held that the statute applied to pleasure boats as well as to commercial vessels. Id. at 9. Although the court acknowledged that pleasure boats were treated
as a distinct class under federal law, it held that federal regulation of such vessels mandated
that they be subject to examination under section 581. Id. at 10. It should be noted, however, that the court's holding did not address the intent of Congress in enacting the statute.
41 See 103 S. Ct. at 2582; supra notes 22-25 and accompanying text.
42See, e.g., Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 219 (1979) (White, J., concurring);
South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 379 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring); United States
v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 879 (1975); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 53637 (1967); Recent Case, supra note 38, at 1024. In Opperman, the defendant's automobile
was towed for violation of a local parking ordinance and was impounded in a city lot. 428
U.S. at 365-66. A subsequent inventory search revealed a quantity of marijuana. Id. at 366.
Based on this evidence the defendant was convicted of possession of marijuana. Id. The
Supreme Court of South Dakota reversed the conviction, holding that the search violated
the fourth amendment. Id. at 366-67. The United States Supreme Court reversed. Id. at
367. Concurring, Justice Powell noted that routine inventory searches served three public
interests: "the protection of the police from danger," the protection of the police from
claims of lost or stolen property, and the safeguarding of the personal property left in the
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two relevant factors are the availability of less intrusive alternatives that would foster the identical government interest and the
ratio of innocent to guilty people affected by the Government's
action.43
While the Government has a strong interest in enforcing customs and vessel documentation laws, there are plausible methods
of enforcement which do not involve the random boarding of a vessel. Fixed checkpoints, for example, have proven successful, even
on the open sea;44 nevertheless, the Villamonte-Marquez Court
automobile by the owner. Id. at 378 (Powell, J., concurring). Justice Powell found that these
interests outweighed the interest of citizens in the privacy of the contents in their
automobiles. Id. at 379-80 (Powell, J., concurring).
United States v. Brignoni-Ponce involved the random stopping of an automobile by a
roving patrol and the questioning of its occupants. 422 U.S. at 874-75. The purpose of such
stops was to prevent the immigration of illegal aliens into the United States. Id. at 879.
Against this public interest, the Court balanced the interference with individual liberty that
results from random stops. Id. The majority held that the public interest did not justify
subjecting all drivers of automobiles to random stops. See id. at 882.
In Camara v. Municipal Court, the Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality of a
warrantless housing inspection. See 387 U.S. at 527. The Court held that the sole test for
determining the reasonableness of the search was to balance "the need to search against the
invasion which the search entails." Id. at 536-37. See generally 1 W. LAFAVE, SEARcH AND
SEIzuRE § 2.1(e), at 236 (1978).
43 Comment, supra note 4, at 1046-47. In Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979), the
Supreme Court ruled that the random stopping of an automobile and the detention of the
driver to check his driver's license and registration violates the fourth amendment. Id. at
663. In reaching this conclusion, the Court recognized that less intrusive alternatives, such
as acting upon observed violations of law or roadblock stops of all traffic, would be as effective as random stops in detecting unlicensed drivers and unregistered vehicles. Id. at 659,
663. The Court also considered the large number of licensed drivers that would be stopped
to find one unlicensed operator. Id. at 659-60. Similarly, in United States v. Brignoni-Ponce,
422 U.S. 873 (1975), the Supreme Court recognized that random roving patrol stops of
automobiles would interfere with a large volume of legitimate traffic, id. at 882, and held
such stops to be unreasonable under the fourth amendment, id. at 883.
'4See, e.g., United States v. Harper, 617 F.2d 35, 38 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
887 (1980). In Harper,the court upheld a boarding pursuant to 14 U.S.C. § 89(a) (1982),
that was conducted at a fixed checkpoint in a well-traveled Carribean sealane. 617 F.2d at
37, 39. All vessels of a size sufficient for large smuggling operations were boarded. Id. at 38.
The court held that the checkpoint stops and boardings were similar to the roadside checkpoints that the Supreme Court had found reasonable. Id. at 39; see United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 562 (1976). Fixed checkpoints also were used in "Operation Stopgap," a program conducted by the United States Coast Guard to curtail drug smuggling
operations. Coast Guard cutters patrolled the Windward, Leeward, Mona, and Yucatan
passages of the Carribean, systematically boarding all vessels of a certain size. See Stopping
"Mother Ships"-A Loophole in Drug Enforcement: Hearings on S.3437 Before The Subcomm. to Investigate Juvenile Delinquency of the Senate Comm. of the Judiciary,95th
Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (1978) (statement of Captain Robert H. Overton, III, Chief of Ocean
Operations, U.S. Coast Guard) [hereinafter cited as Drug Enforcement]; Collier, New U.S.
War to CollarDrug Smugglers and Their Untaxed Billions, Sunday Cape Cod Times, Sept.
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discounted this alternative as impractical in a maritime or inland
water setting.45 The Court did not mention other, less intrusive alternatives,
such as checking documentation by radio or by hailing.46 Nor did Justice Rehnquist consider the large number of innocent pleasure boat owners who would be subject to
indiscriminate boardings pursuant to section 1581(a).47 Instead,
the Court's holding was justified by the assertion that the boarding
presented only a limited intrusion. 48 It is submitted, however, that

this rather selective application of the balancing test is flawed in
its failure to consider these relevant factors.
By distinguishing between automobiles and vessels, the Court
has made the physical area intruded upon by the Government the
determinative factor in a fourth amendment balancing test. 9 This
distinction derives from the literal application of the fourth
amendment employed by the Court in the early half of this century 50 In the late 1960's, however, the Supreme Court shifted the
emphasis away from physical characteristics to focus instead on
the reasonable expectation of privacy of the individuals subject to
17, 1978 (Parade Magazine), at 4. This operation was considered quite successful in confiscating contraband. See Drug Enforcement, supra, at 6 (statement of Sen. John Chafee).
45 Despite the majority's aversion to fixed checkpoints on waterways, see 103 S. Ct. at
2580, the nature of the Calcasieu River Ship Channel, as the dissent indicated, made fixed
checkpoints a plausible alternative to random stoppings and boardings, see id. at 2589
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
" See, e.g., United States v. Green, 671 F.2d 46, 48-49 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 457 U.S.
1135 (1982); United States v. Arra, 630 F.2d 836, 838 (1st Cir. 1980). See generally Note,
High on the Seas: Drug Smuggling, The FourthAmendment, and WarrantlessSearches at
Sea, 93 HARv. L. REv. 725, 737-38 (1980). The Coast Guard is required to publish a list of all
documented vessels together with any pertinent information about the vessels. 46 U.S.C. §
65s (Supp. V 1981). It has been suggested that ship-to-shore communication can be used to
relay this information to officers patrolling the waters. See Villamonte-Marquez, 103 S. Ct.
at 2590 (Brennan, J., dissenting). In addition, if the master of the vessel has a manifest,
customs officers may request the master to come aboard their ship so that the manifest may
be inspected. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting). Finally, customs officers could forego boarding
until they observed or reasonably suspected unlawful activity. See supra note 32 and accompanying text; cf. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 883 ("characteristics of smuggling operations tend to generate articulable grounds for identifying violators").
'1 See 103 S. Ct. at 2581-82; see also supra note 40 and accompanying text (historical
pedigree of statute extends only to commercial vessels).
41 103 S. Ct. at 2582. The Court acknowledged that the interference caused by the
boarding was a "modest intrusion." Id. at 2581-82. Nevertheless, the Court stated that the
intrusion was outweighed by the Government's interest in assuring compliance with the documentation laws and the need to deter smugglers. Id. at 2582.
49 See id. at 2579-80.
1OSee supra note 1.
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the particular search or seizure. 1 It is suggested that by rigidly
distinguishing between automobiles and vessels, the VillamonteMarquez Court neglected to accord due weight to the reasonable
expectation of privacy possessed by operators and passengers of
vessels.52
As the dissent observed, a vessel commonly serves as a dwelling for its occupants.53 Therefore, if a distinction is to be made
between automobiles and vessels, it should be recognized that the
occupants of a vessel have a greater expectation of privacy than
those of an automobile.54 Although this expectation of privacy
1 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). In Katz, the defendant sought to suppress tapes of phone conversations that he had made from a public phone booth. Id. at 348.
The Government contended that since there was no actual physical penetration of the
phone booth, the case should escape fourth amendment analysis. Id. at 352. The Court held
that "the Fourth Amendment protects people-and not simply 'areas'-against unreasonable searches and seizures [and] it becomes clear that the reach of that Amendment cannot
turn upon the presence or absence of a physical intrusion into any given enclosure." Id. at
353. Cases that exemplify the trend that the Court has followed since Katz include Brown v.
Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 51 (1979), and Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 662 (1979). In Brown,
the appellant was stopped and questioned by police officers in an alley because he looked
suspicious. 443 U.S. at 48-49. The Court held that this stop and detention constituted a
seizure of appellant's person. Id. at 50. The Court used a balancing test to determine the
constitutionality of the seizure, id. at 50-51, and recognized that the central concern of the
test was the protection of an individual's reasonable expectation of privacy from arbitrary
Government intrusion, id. at 51. In Brown, the balance fell in favor of the individual's right
to personal privacy. Id. at 52. Similarly, in concluding that random automobile stops by the
police violated the fourth amendment, the Prouse Court declared that an individual "does
not lose all reasonable expectation of privacy" when he enters an automobile. 440 U.S. at
662-63.
The Court, however, has applied Katz in a limited manner. See LaFave, Supreme
Court Report, 69 A.B.A. J. 1740, 1740 (1983). For example, in Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S.
735 (1979), the Court held that the use of a pen register, a device that records the numbers
dialed from an individual's phone, was not a search within the meaning of the fourth
amendment. Id. at 745-46. The majority reasoned that the petitioner could have no expectation of privacy since he had voluntarily transmitted the number he dialed to the phone
company. Id. at 744-45; see also Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 144 n.12 (1978) (Court has
not abandoned concepts of property law in determining existence of privacy interest protected by fourth amendment).
" Cf. United States v. Streifel, 665 F.2d 414, 423 (2d Cir. 1981) (need to stop vessels
not significantly different from need to stop vehicles).
53 103 S. Ct. at 2588 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
" Note, supra note 46, at 728. In United States v. Cadena, 588 F.2d 100 (5th Cir. 1979),
the Fifth Circuit, while declining to treat searches of vessels differently from searches of
automobiles, stated that there was a greater expectation of privacy aboard a vessel than in a
van or curtained limousine. Id. at 101. The Ninth Circuit, in United States v. Piner, 608
F.2d 358 (9th Cir. 1979), though not expressly recognizing that a greater expectation of privacy exists aboard a vessel, held that random stops of pleasure boats after dark were not
constitutionally permissible. Id. at 361. The court based its holding on the availability of a
less intrusive means of enforcing vessel safety regulations. Id. It may be argued that the
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must be balanced against the Federal Government's interest in enforcing the smuggling and vessel documentation laws, it is suggested that the Government's interest in recreational vessels is less
compelling than its interest in commercial vessels. 5 It is further
suggested that the correct balancing of interests mandates that the
standards employed for the stopping and boarding of pleasure vessels at least be set at the level of those governing automobile
stops5 6
Piner majority implicitly recognized that stopping and boarding a recreational vessel at
night involves a greater intrusion on an individual's privacy interest than the random stop
of an automobile. Cf. Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 590 (1974) (plurality opinion) (lesser
expectation of privacy in vehicle because it seldom serves as a residence).
It should be noted that the Ninth Circuit, in United States v. Williams, 630 F.2d 1322
(9th Cir.), cert. denied sub noma. 449 U.S. 865 (1980), held that an individual's reasonable
expectation of privacy in a motor home is significantly greater than in an automobile. Id. at
1326; accord People v. Carney, 34 Cal. 3d 597, 603, 668 P.2d 807, 812, 194 Cal. Rptr. 500,
505 (1983), cert. granted, 52 U.S.L.W. 3687 (Mar. 19, 1984). In Carney, the California Supreme Court acknowledged that a motor home only serves as a temporary residence, but
concluded that the temporary nature of the living quarters did not diminish the occupant's
reasonable expectation of privacy. Id. at 604, 668 P.2d at 813, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 506. In
support of this conclusion, the court noted that personal effects were more likely to be
found in a motor home than in an automobile and that whereas the interior of an automobile usually was exposed to the public, the interior of a motor home commonly was shielded
from public view. Id.
55 See United States v. Williams, 544 F.2d 807, 811 (5th Cir. 1977). Williams involved
the boarding of a houseboat by customs agents pursuant to section 1581(a). Id. at 808. The
court held that customs enforcement applied only to vessels which normally carried cargo or
persons subject to the customs laws. Id. at 811. Indeed, the customs laws maintain a distinction between recreational and commercial vessels. For example, American vessels arriving
from a foreign port or place and all foreign vessels are required to make entry at the appropriate customhouse. See 19 U.S.C. §§ 1434-1435 (1982). However, "Vllicensed yachts or undocumented American pleasure vessels not engaged in trade nor in any way violating the
customs or navigation laws of the United States" are not required to make entry at the
customhouse. Id. § 1441(3). Nevertheless, though not required to make entry at the customhouse, pleasure boats now are subject to random boardings by customs officers. See 103 S.
Ct. at 2582. With respect to the Federal Government's interest in assuring compliance with
the federal documentation laws, it should be noted that the federal documentation law for
pleasure vessels is optional. See 46 U.S.C. § 651 (Supp. V 1981).
" The first of the important cases that formulated the fourth amendment standards for
automobile stops was Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973). In AlmeidaSanchez, the Supreme Court held that a full search of an automobile by a roving patrol on
an east-west highway 20 miles north of the Mexican border did not fall within the border
search exception and was, therefore, impermissible absent probable cause or consent. Id. at
273. Two years later, in United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975), the Court
held that random stops of vehicles near the border violated the fourth amendment unless
the officers had a reasonable suspicion of unlawful activity. Id. at 882. The Court noted that
a tremendous amount of legitimate traffic would be impeded if officers were allowed the
discretion to stop any vehicle at random. Id. In United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S.
543 (1976), the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of checkpoint stops of
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Circumvention of the Warrant Requirement
Although the majority asserted that Villamonte-Marquez
presented an opportunity to resolve a conflict between the circuits,57 it is suggested that the Court erred in perceiving such a

conflict. The circuit courts have upheld warrantless boardings that
fell within two categories: (1) a border search at the functional
equivalent of the border if the officers are reasonably certain that
the vessel crossed the border;58 (2) an investigatory stop if the customs officers have a reasonable suspicion that there is unlawful activity aboard the vessel.59 These criteria are not mutually exclusive
and the Court could have adopted both, thus affording the necessary protection to fourth amendment rights.8 0 Instead, the Court
held that the exercise of unlimited authority pursuant to the plain
language of the statute was acceptable under the fourth amendment.61 In creating an exception to the warrant requirement that
automobiles, holding that such stops may be made even in the absence of a reasonable suspicion of unlawful activity. Id. at 566. The Martinez-FuerteCourt observed that the reasonable suspicion requirement for stops on major inland roads would be impractical when there
is a heavy flow of traffic. Id. at 557. Checkpoint stops were deemed reasonable because innocent motorists would not be taken by surprise as in random stops and, unlike random stops,
checkpoint stops imposed some limits on the law officers' discretion. Id. at 559. Finally, in
Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979), the Court held that the random stopping of an
automobile to check a motorist's driver's license and the vehicle's registration was unreasonable within the meaning of the fourth amendment in the absence of a reasonable suspicion
of a violation of the law. Id. at 663.
"7See 103 S. Ct. at 2577. While the Ninth Circuit has upheld boardings pursuant to
section 1581(a) under the border search exception to the warrant requirement, see, e.g.,
United States v. Tilton, 534 F.2d 1363, 1366 (9th Cir. 1976), the other circuits generally
have analogized these boardings to investigatory stops requiring a reasonable suspicion of
unlawful activity, see, e.g., United States v. Green, 671 F.2d 46, 53-54 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1135 (1982); United States v. Streifel, 665 F.2d 414, 422 (2d Cir. 1981);
United States v. D'Antignac, 628 F.2d 428, 434 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 967
(1981); see supra note 4.
" See, e.g., United States v. Harper, 617 F.2d 35, 37 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
887 (1980); United States v. Tilton, 534 F.2d 1363, 1366 (9th Cir. 1976); United States v.
Solmes, 527 F.2d 1370, 1372 (9th Cir. 1975).
10 See, e.g., United States v. Green, 671 F.2d 46, 53-54 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 457 U.S.
1135 (1982); United States v. Streifel, 665 F.2d 414, 422 (2d Cir. 1981); United States v.
Rivera, 595 F.2d 1095, 1098 (5th Cir. 1979).
10 See, e.g., Blair v. United States, 665 F.2d 500, 505 (4th Cir. 1981) (customs officers
boarding vessel must have reasonable suspicion of law violation in absence of evidence indicating vessel crossed border); United States v. D'Antignac, 628 F.2d 428, 433 (5th Cir. 1980)
(constitutionality of section 1581(a) boarding dependent on it being either a border search
or an investigatory stop where customs officers had a reasonable suspicion of unlawful activity), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 967 (1981).
61 See 103 S. Ct. at 2577, 2582.
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permits customs officers unlimited discretion to stop and board
any vessel they choose, the Court may have overlooked the dangers
of improper use of such authority as a device to circumvent the
protections of the Constitution.2 Under the facade of a section
1581(a) documentation check, overzealous customs officers may
board vessels indiscriminately with vague hopes of obtaining evidence of such serious violations as smuggling.63 Never before has
the Court permitted law enforcement officials such unlimited discretion to conduct "fishing expeditions."" Indeed, VillamonteMarquez represents yet another extension of the recent trend of
Burger Court decisions weakening the fourth amendment.6 5 It is
62

See Note, supra note 46, at 741. A Coast Guard commander described the typical

method of boarding vessels:
Warning shots usually stop them. Then we board, usually with five men in a
smaller boat, well armed. We say we are operating under a law .... It's a subterfuge. We say we are running a check for "compliance with U.S. law." Or we say:
"We are authorized under umpty-umpty-ump of the government something," and
we board.
If it's empty, we do a routine safety inspection, which is a warrantless search.
There is the Fourth Amendment, which is designed to prevent unreasonable
searches and seizures, and we have to be careful not to violate the guy's freedom.
Collier, supra note 44, at 7 (statement of Coast Guard Commander John Streeper).
63 See infra note 65 and accompanying text. Given the size of most recreational vessels,
once customs officers are on board, any stop can become a full scale search, since the officers
can see everything on the deck, and often can view the interior through open hatchways.
Comment, supra note 4, at 1039 n.49; see, e.g., Villamonte-Marquez, 103 S. Ct. at 2577
(marijuana spotted through open hatch); United States v. Acosta, 489 F. Supp. 61, 63 (S.D.
Fla. 1980) (customs officer opening closed hatch and spotting marijuana); cf. State v. Doyle,
409 So. 2d 1168, 1169 n.2 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (sole intention of customs officer in
stopping vessel was to search for contraband). In both Acosta and Doyle, the Government
relied on the authority conferred by section 1581(a). See 489 F. Supp. at 64; 409 So. 2d at
1169.
64 The discretion given to customs officers by section 1581(a) is similar to that given to
inspectors of the various businesses that fall within the administrative search exception to
the warrant requirement. See, e.g., Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977, § 103(a), 30
U.S.C. § 813(a) (Supp. V 1981). The administrative search exception differs from the exception created by the Court in Villamonte-Marquez because it applies only to industries Aubject to pervasive government regulation. See, e.g., Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 606
(1981) (mining industry); United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 316 (1972) (firearms dealers); Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72, 77 (1970) (liquor industry).
The administrative search exception is justified by the diminished expectation of privacy
that entrants into such industries have due to extensive government regulation. 1 W.
RINGEL, supra note 1, § 14.3(b)(2), at 14-15. Professor LaFave has expressed concern that
Villamonte-Marquez could set a dangerous precedent for similar unlimited conferrals of law
enforcement authority. See LaFave, supra note 51, at 1746.
6 See, e.g., Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128 (1978). In Scott, government agents
had taped all conversations over one phone during a 1-month period. Id. at 130-31. Despite
the fact that a statute required that wiretapping or surveillance be done in such a way as to
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suggested that an exception to the warrant requirement that allows
for the possibility of such searches without probable cause unnecessarily subverts the fourth amendment.
CONCLUSION

The fundamental constitutional rights secured by the fourth
amendment should be afforded the utmost protection by the judiciary.66 It is submitted that in Villamonte-Marquez the Court
could have interpreted section 1581(a) in a manner more consistent with fourth amendment safeguards without unduly impeding
the effectiveness of customs officers. As one member of the judiciary has noted, "[t]he shield against unreasonable searches does not
minimize the interception of "communications not otherwise subject to interception," 18
U.S.C. § 2518(5) (1982), the Supreme Court held that the agents' activity was not unreasonable. 436 U.S. at 143. Another decision of the Burger Court that weakened fourth amendment protections was Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978), in which the Court held that the
introduction of incriminating evidence obtained during an illegal search or seizure of a third
party's property did not violate the defendant's fourth amendment rights, id. at 134. In the
more recent case of Illinois v. Gates, 103 S. Ct. 2317 (1983), the Court addressed the meaning of probable cause with respect to a warrant issued based on information supplied by an
anonymous informant and abandoned the Aguilar-Spinelli"two-pronged test." Id. at 2332.
The test arose from two Supreme Court cases, Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964), and
Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969). The first prong, "basis of knowledge," required a demonstration that the informant had a basis for his knowledge of the pertinent
criminal conduct. 1 W. LAFAvE, supra note 42, § 3.3(a), at 501-02; see Spinelli, 393 U.S. at
416; Aguilar, 378 U.S. at 114. The second prong, "veracity," required the establishment of
the informant's credibility. 1 W. LAFAvE, supra note 42, § 3.3(a), at 502. See Aguilar, 378
U.S. at 114. In place of the "two-pronged test," the Gates Court adopted a general "totality
of the circumstances analysis" to determine the existence of probable cause. 103 S. Ct. at
2332.
It is suggested that this weakening of fourth amendment protections may be traced to
several Justices' attitude toward the exclusionary rule. Chief Justice Burger and Justices
White, Rehnquist, Blackmun, and Powell have expressed their unhappiness with the rule.
McMillian, Is There Anything Left of the Fourth Amendment?, 24 ST. Louis U.L.J. 1, 2-3
(1979); see, e.g., Rakas, 439 U.S. at 137 (Rehnquist, J.) (application of exclusionary rule
exacts substantial cost). Not surprisingly, all five of these Justices were in the majority in
Villamonte-Marquez. For a discussion of the Burger Court's treatment of recent fourth
amendment cases, see LaFave, supra note 51, at 1740-48.
66 See Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 273 (1973). In Brinegar v.
United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949), Justice Jackson, dissenting, noted that the rights secured by the fourth amendment
are not mere second-class rights but belong in the catalog of indispensable freedoms. Among deprivations of rights, none is so effective in cowing a population,
crushing the spirit of the individual and putting terror in every heart. Uncontrolled search and seizure is one of the first and most effective weapons in the
arsenal of every arbitrary government.
Id. at 180 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
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rust on exposure to salt air . ..
7 By subjecting the fundamental
rights of boaters to the unlimited discretion of customs officers, the
Court has eviscerated the fourth amendment, not only as it applies
in the maritime setting, but with respect to inland waters as well.""
Lawrence A. Levy

17 United States v. Williams, 617 F.2d 1063, 1095 (5th Cir. 1980) (Rubin, J., concurring).
68Although the Villamonte-Marquez decision refers to waters with access to the open
sea, 103 S. Ct. at 2580, the language of the statute is broad enough to support the boarding
of "any vessel or vehicle at any place in the United States or within the customs waters," 19
U.S.C. § 1581(a) (1982) (emphasis added); see supra note 3 and accompanying text.

